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ABSTRACT. While the analysis of liberalism fills much of The Birth of Biopolitics, the focus of 
Foucault’s discussion is on the dynamic, equivocal and enigmatic contemporary condition at the 
intersection of welfare governance, biopolitics and neo-liberalism of the late seventies. This article 
examines The Birth of Biopolitics as a prolongation of Security, Territoriality and Population by 
analyzing how Foucault frames liberalism in the wider historical context of governmentality. 
In Foucault’s view, governmentality should be understood as a secular rationalization of the 
art of government. While the pastoral power of the Catholic Church was wielded against the 
backdrop of eschatology and the imminence of the end of worldly power, the early modern 
concept of reason of state brought with it the idea of an interminable history. Governmentality and 
reason of state spring from an undecided and precarious European balance of power between 
competing states. In order to measure up to external competition, individual states are required to 
develop a system of policing that collects detailed knowledge of the body politic. Insofar as the 
logic of the population as a collection of living beings comes to the fore as a primary target of 
government intervention, the imperatives of biopolitics and the politics of health arise. 
Liberalism forms an important modification of the double heritage of reason of state and 
biopolitics. This is a rationalization of government that, rather than breaking with the fundamental 
assumptions of governmentality, critically addresses the basic criteria for good government. 
Stressing the necessity for good government to acknowledge and incorporate the self-regulation 
of the population it governs, liberalism thus articulates a new kind of naturalness intrinsic to the 
population springing from the interaction between individuals motivated by self-interest. As a 
basic principle for its understanding of governing, liberalism embraces a natural history without 
any transcendental horizons, a secular and tragic natural history in which freedom can never be 
taken for granted insofar as its participants constantly constitute a danger for one another. It is 
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also a mode of history in which the art of government is constantly called upon and forced to 
organize and secure the conditions for the exercise and development of freedom. For Foucault, 
thus, the liberal art of government is not a position to be affirmed or denied. Rather, the liberal art 
of government draws the outline of an experience of historicity that is an experience of an ongoing 
and unsettling, but also unending, crisis. 
Keywords: Biopolitics, governmentality, liberalism, neoliberalism, totalitarianism, welfare, 
security, reason of state, freedom, natural history, population, crisis 
INTRODUCTION 
Naissance de la biopolitique, Foucault’s twelve-lesson lecture course at the Collège de France 
in the spring of 1979, covered a broad range of historical and contemporary topics, 
including the art of government, population, liberalism and neoliberalism, the state, civil 
society, political economy, sovereignty, liberty and security. Foucault was sketching in 
remarkable detail the pathologies of an imminent future.1 Certainly, his undertaking is 
not based on a phenomenological experience of society without calendar or geography, 
nor is it a theoretical reconstruction of political philosophy; its focus is on the critical 
experience of a society that has become a privileged site for “the government of men 
insofar as it appears as the exercise of political sovereignty.”2 The lectures address a 
situation where the primary field of intervention for the arts of government materializes 
as a civil society inhabited by a spontaneously self-regulating population juxtaposed to 
both the super-institution of the state and the global environment of the market. This is 
the context of Foucault’s attempt to measure and analyze the “rationalization of 
governmental practice in the exercise of political sovereignty”3 worked out by different 
variants of liberalism. 
Even if the theme of liberalism occupies most of the space in Naissance de la biopolitique, 
it should be noted that the societal experience in question is not reducible to the ‘lack’ of 
society typically associated with neoliberalism – summed up in Margaret Thatcher’s 
famous quip: “There is no such thing as society.”4 Foucault interprets liberalism within 
 
1 Of course, there were many features of current neoliberalism Foucault could not anticipate. In her book 
Undoing the Demos. Neoliberalism´s Stealth Revolution. Near Futures (2015), Wendy Brown analyzes the main 
features of neoliberal reason in continuance with and also beyond Foucault´s historical landscape. Among 
these are the exponential rise of finance capital, the generalization of economic growth as a goal and as 
imperative both for the state and the economy, the global effects of financial crises, the implementation of 
austerity programs, the marketization of the state, the rise of “governance” and its consequences in the task 
of reshaping of socioeconomic relationships, new techniques of subjection through human capital and 
embodied responsibility, the “too big to fail” and its reverse “too small to protect” as a new grid distributing 
insurances and risks, and the entanglement between neoliberalism and securitization in the period post-9/11. 
2 Michel Foucault, Naissance de la biopolitique: Cours au Collège de France, 1977-79, 4/Michel Foucault, The Birth 
of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979, 2. 
3 Foucault, Naissance de la biopolitique, 4; Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, 2. 
4 Cf., e.g., Margaret Thatcher: “There is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women, and 
there are families” (“Interview,” Women’s Own 1987, October: 8-10). Less known is that Thatcher echoes 
almost ad verbatim Friedrich Hayek, see F.A. Hayek. Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul 1967, 237. 
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the much wider framework of governmental rationalities. Thus, his investigation of 
neoliberalism in The Birth of Biopolitics should be read as a continuation of Foucault’s 
analysis of governmentality, reason of state and biopolitics as developed in the lectures 
from the previous year Sécurité, territoire, population. By losing sight of his continuously 
open-ended historical investigation,5 commentaries often end up reproaching Foucault 
for adopting a too undifferentiated attitude pro or con neo-liberalism, or even for 
endorsing the present phenomenon of neo-liberalism,6 rather than understanding his 
attempt to articulate these issues as part of a continuous Denkweg (path of thought) and an 
ongoing diagnostic activity.7  
Upon closer inspection, the idea and the expectation that Foucault was aiming to take 
a stand with regard to a hegemony of neo-liberal thought and practice, which may seem 
reasonable if The Birth of Biopolitics is read in isolation, is inappropriate. It is out-of-place 
for the simple conjectural or circumstantial reason that neoliberalist domination had not 
even fully arrived yet, not to say burst into full bloom, when Foucault began examining 
neoliberalism in the spring of 1979. Foucault cannot be read as addressing a ‘neoliberal 
condition’ for the simple reason that he did not live and work in a context where 
neoliberalism could be said to prevail. Moreover, it is also erroneous for the more general 
and ‘methodical’ reason that it tends to misinterpret Foucault’s diagnostical approach 
plainly laid out in all his previously published major works. In the lectures 1978-1979, 
Foucault is not primarily interested in examining neoliberalism and taking a stand with 
regard to it as a fully realized state of affairs; rather, Foucault here takes an interest in 
examining a decisive transitional state that is still arriving and under development in 
order to explore where it might lead by scrutinizing its historical genesis. This ambition 
is also voiced in Foucault's own words from Security, Territory, Population: “We now find 
ourselves in a perspective in which historical time is indefinite (indéfini), in a perspective 
of indefinite governmentality with no foreseeable term or final aim. We are in an open 
historicity due to the indefinite character of the political art.”8 
The first main section of this article sets out to describe the establishment of 
governmentality in the proper sense and with it the constitution of an indefinite history 
that has already begun and seems never-ending. The section starts out by examining the 
constitution of governmentality in the modern sense as it distinguishes itself from 
 
5 This point is equally highlighted in Erlenbusch-Anderson’s contribution to this special issue “The 
Beginning of a Study of Biopower: Foucault’s 1978 Lectures at the Collège de France.” 
6 Cf., e.g., various contributions to Behrent and Zamora (eds.), Foucault and Neoliberalism (2016). Cf. also 
Behrent, “Liberalism without Humanism: Michel Foucault and the Free-Marked Creed, 1976-1979.” In a 
famous exchange on Foucault’s work at the University of Chicago in 2012, François Ewald implicitly asserts 
Foucault’s endorsement of liberalism, as he asks: “How was it possible that an intellectual, a French 
philosopher – someone perhaps known as a Left French philosopher, a radical – would deliver, at the end of 
the 1970s, a lecture at the Collège de France where he would make the apology of neoliberalism (…)” (Becker 
et al., “Becker on Ewald on Foucault on Becker: American Neoliberalism and Michel Foucault’s ‘Birth of 
Biopolitics’ Lectures (September 5, 2012),”  4.). By contrast, a more well-considered assessment is voiced by 
Ewald’s interlocutor in the exchange, Bernard Harcourt. 
7 Sverre Raffnsøe et al., Michel Foucault: A Research Companion (2016), xi-xii, 38-97. 
8 Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 266/Security, Territory, Population, 260. 
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previously established pastoral power. Whereas the art of government in pastoral power 
is still to be understood as a protective shepherding within a larger pre-existing cosmo-
theological framework and in continuation of God’s command on Earth, a first, specific 
secular rationalization of the art of government appears with the appearance of the reason of 
state. With the reason of state, the art of government not only binds itself to taking care of 
the state as a specific and relative reality that must be created and maintained but also 
comes to be guided by the logic of its privileged object of intervention over which it must 
assert its power. With this transition, the governmentality finds itself committed to the 
necessity of taking part in a history that has always already begun and never ends. 
The second main section deals with the particular predicaments faced by the emerging 
reason of state, the open-ended nature of history and the post-Westphalian European 
balance of power. Internally, this requires the establishment of a developed police order 
collecting as much knowledge about the object to be governed as possible in order to face 
external competition. Insofar as the logic of the population as a collection of living beings 
here comes to the fore as a primary target of intervention of government, this 
development gives rise to the birth of biopolitics and the politics of health. When 
government is perceived as a form of power that targets social biology as its chief object, 
politics acquires an unprecedented generalized and essential importance for human 
subsistence. 
The third section articulates the modification of this kind of governmentality as 
described by Foucault in The Birth of Biopolitics. Following Foucault, liberalism is to be 
understood as a rationalization of government that internally addresses and refines 
governmentality as it had been established in the tradition from the reason of state by 
reminding it of its basic criteria for good government. Rather than breaking with its 
fundamental assumptions, liberal critique emphasizes the principle that government 
must take into account any given population’s self-regulation by imposing on itself a work 
of self-limitation. This makes a new kind of social naturalness appear intrinsic to the 
population, and one that must be respected by government. As a result of the interaction 
between human biological beings driven by their self-interest, social antagonisms arise 
that make up the motor of a natural history that has always already begun and that seems 
interminable. 
The fourth section discusses the development of modes of perceiving history as 
discussed in The Birth of Biopolitics and in the previous years’ lectures. By looking back on 
and providing an overview of the different phases of governmentality, as well as 
emphasizing the relative continuity in the development described, the section articulates 
Foucault’s analysis of the various notions of historicity appearing in and through these 
phases. A secular natural history without transcendence appears as the motor driving 
historical development, together with a governmentality constantly calling itself and its 
own exercise into question. It entails a tragic conception of history in which the exercise 
of freedom can never be taken for granted. Not only do the participants constantly oppose 
one another, thus impeding the exercise of their own freedom, they also permanently 
constitute a danger for one another. For this reason, the natural history of liberalism is a 
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historicity in which the art of government relentlessly strives to organize the conditions 
for the exercise of freedom, and the nature of the subjects and the objects that should be 
considered normal or abnormal, valuable or dangerous, in the game of legitimate 
freedom. Liberal governance is thus not a position to be affirmed, instead, it draws the 
outline of an experience of historicity that is an experience of an ongoing, unsettling, and 
unending crisis of governmentality. 
1. THE APPEARANCE OF GOVERNMENTALITY AND ITS UNYIELDING 
HISTORICITY 
At the beginning of The Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault underscores that the lectures pursue 
the themes from the previous year.9 Concomitantly, Foucault voices his intentions with 
the lecture series The Birth of Biopolitics: “I would like to continue with what I began to talk 
about last year, that is to say, to retrace the history of what could be called the art of 
government” and carry on studying “the government of men insofar as it appears as the 
exercise of political sovereignty” and “the study of the rationalization of governmental 
practice in the exercise of political sovereignty.”10 He further stipulates the theme as an 
inflection of rationalization of governmental reason in the exercise of political sovereignty. 
It is noteworthy that Foucault stresses how “it is only when we understand what is at 
stake in this regime of liberalism opposed to raison d’État – or rather, fundamentally 
modifying (it) without, perhaps questioning its bases – only when we know what this 
governmental regime called liberalism was, will we be able to grasp what biopolitics is.”11 
1.1. The pre-history of governmentality: Pastoral power and eschatology 
Foucault´s studies on pastoral power can be read as a “prehistory of governmental 
rationality.”12 Pastoral power is a power/knowledge relation that rests on the idea that the 
shepherd is in possession of a truth that will allow him to lead each and every sheep in 
the flock to Salvation. With the pastorate a process is instituted that should be seen as 
absolutely unique: the process by which a religion, a religious community, constitutes 
itself as a Church, as an institution that claims the right to govern men in their daily life 
on the grounds of leading them to eternal life. Moreover, the object of this practice is not 
limited to a definite group, a city of a state, but comprises the whole of humanity.13 
Initiated around the time of the Church Fathers,14 the Christian pastoral system 
continued to exist throughout the 12 catholic centuries following the creation of the 
Church. During this time, the pastoral structure of governmental rationality was 
 
9 “A more exact title” of this lecture series, Foucault suggests, would have been “a history of 
‘governmentality’” (Foucault, Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 111/Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 108). 
10 Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 3-4/Security, Territory, Population, 2-3. 
11 Naissance de la biopolitique, 24/The Birth of Biopolitics, 22. 
12 Raffnsøe et al., Michel Foucault. Research Companion, 258-265. 
13 Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 151/Security, Territory, Population, 148. 
14 Sverre Raffnsøe, “Michel Foucault’s Confessions of the Flesh. The fourth volume of the History of 
Sexuality”, Foucault Studies 25:2 (2018). 
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revitalized several times through a number of reform-movements, including the monastic 
way of life.15 With the appearance of beggar-monks, pastoral governmentality from the 
13th century was increasingly transplanted to the surrounding population. This 
development was strengthened in the 16th century with the Reformation and the 
Counter-Reformation. Pastoral leadership would – from this time on – increasingly 
intervene in everyday life, where it also became the subject of increasing criticism. 
The pastoral formula omnes et singulatim (“everyone and each”) synthesizes the main 
feature of a relationship that is simultaneously collective and individual, treating 
everyone as a part of a whole and the whole as composed by individuals.16 The plight of 
the shepherd is to risk his life for the salvation of each and every individual sheep. It is a 
logic of thought that unifies the whole of humanity under the scope of a unified 
temporality, thus politics becomes the continuation of God´s command on Earth. 
Governing, and politics in general, is transformed into protective shepherding, which 
eventually gave rise to the agitation and aggressiveness of servility that has become a 
feature of Western European political rationality. This involves a propensity toward 
aggression or even violence in the exercise of government toward both internal as well as 
external threats – in the name of the common good and even individual care-taking. 
1.2. The history of governmentality: The appearance of raison d’état 
The traditional conception of sovereignty and dominance was for most of the Medieval 
period characterized by there being no distinction between exerting sovereignty and rule. 
As long as every member of society sought the individual and common good within the 
framework of an over-arching cosmo-theological continuum, there was no fixed 
boundary between sovereignty and rule. The monarch or prince could therefore not easily 
be distinguished from the religious leader or pastor. The head of the family, the monarch, 
and God ruled in similar ways within that continuum. The dissemination of 
governmentality was therefore limited to the Christian, pastoral tradition. 
However, the cosmo-theological continuum came under significant pressure during 
the 1500s and 1600s, when a de-pastoralization of government and world took place. New 
kinds of knowledge, such as Johannes Kepler’s (1571–1630) astronomy, Galileo Galilei’s 
(1564–1642) and Isaac Newton’s (1642–1727) natural philosophy, as well as John Ray’s 
(1628–1705) natural history suggested that God only affected the world through universal, 
eternal, and simple laws that man could know.17 The world was no longer viewed as 
influenced by divine miracles that revealed God’s existence as a pastor that intervened in 
individual cases. God governed the totality of the universe and ruled over it in general. 
In extension, the pastoral government of people no longer seemed so extensive or 
definitive. The government people exerted over each other had to be something other and 
 
15 Foucault, “‘Omnes et singulatim:’ vers un critique”, 144-147/Foucault, “‘Omnes et singulatim:’ Towards a 
Criticism”, 308-311. 
16 Michel Foucault, “‘Omnes et singulatim:’ vers un critique de la raison politique” [1979] (1994)/Michel 
Foucault, “‘Omnes et singulatim:’ Towards a Criticism of Political Reason” [1979] (2000). 
17 Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 240/Security, Territory, Population, 311. 
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more than the total and general dominance that God exerted upon nature. The art of 
government could no longer rely on some paradigm but rather had to have its own 
particular logic that could be sought out and explored. Human governmentality had to 
seek out its principles within human society – in the object it sought to govern. This 
resulted in a ratio etatus, or a limited mode of reasoning, which could be applied insofar 
as one was concerned with issues of state. When it appeared, it marked a difference from 
principia natura or the general and universal principles of nature. 
This secularization of governmentality became manifest from the middle of the 1600s 
with the appearance of a genre of literature that explored the rationality of secular 
governance. In fact, the genre originated already in the 16th century with Guillaume de 
la Perrière’s (1499–1565) Le miroir politique from 1555 and Giovanni Botero’s (1540–1617) 
Della ragion di Stato from 1589, but it had its golden age in the 17th century with Federico 
Bonaventura’s (1555–1602) Delle ragion di stato published posthumously from 1623, 
Naudé’s (1600–1653) Considerations politiques sur le coup d’État from 1639, and Bogislaw 
Phillipp von Chemnitz’s (1605–1678) De Ratione Status from 1674. It continued from there 
into the subsequent century. In literature concerning raison d’état, the aim was no longer 
to advise the king about rule but to preserve and extend the state. In extension, it became 
possible to emphasize limitations to the power held by the head of state by noting that the 
king dominated and ruled but did not govern. Already in an early lecture in 1978, 
Foucault quotes the sentence as an outstandingly clear statement of the differentiation 
between governmentality and rule: “while I have been speaking about population a word 
has constantly recurred – you will say that this was deliberate, but it may not be entirely 
so – and this is the word ‘government.’ The more I have spoken about population, the 
more I have stopped saying ‘sovereign.’ Or was led to designate or aim at something that 
again I think is relatively new, not in the word, and not at a certain level of reality, but as 
a new technique. Or rather, the modern political problem, the privilege that government 
begins to exercise in relation to rules, to the extent that, to limit the king’s power, it will 
be possible one day to say ‘the king reigns, but he does not govern’, this inversion of 
government and the reign or rule and the fact that government is basically much more 
than sovereignty, much more than reigning and ruling, much more than the imperium, is, 
I think, absolutely linked to the population.”18 
It would appear that reasons of state always rejected notions of justice and 
reasonableness in order to promote the interest of the state. However, in the literature, the 
term ‘state’ was viewed as positive and poignant. ‘State’ was understood as reliable 
government of a people. The state was able to establish security and order. In the reason 
of state, one sought to understand what had to be done to establish, maintain, and extend 
 
18 Cf. Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 78/Security, Territory, Population, 76. Foucault quotes a famous phrase in 
a February 4, 1830, article in The National, published by French historian and politician Marie Joseph Louis 
Adolphe Thiers (1797–1877). The phrase “rex regnat et non gubernat” was voiced 200 years earlier by the 
Polish-Lithuanian nobleman and Great Crown Chancellor Jan Zamoyski (1542–1605). In both cases the 
maxim advocates the need to limit monarchy within the confines of constitutional sovereignty. For Foucault, 
however, the antinomy between two forms of power stated in the aphorism presupposes that a regime of 
government different from rule, sovereignty, and imperium has been developed. 
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such a dominion. Botero’s Della ragion di stato provides the following definitions of ‘state’ 
and reason of state: “State is a stable rule over people and Reason of State is the knowledge 
of the means by which such a dominion may be founded, preserved and extended”.19 
According to Botero, there was a special and positive commitment to govern. The truth of 
governmental rationality could be explored and known, such that stability and 
development could be combined. The art of governing was a separate and independent 
activity that sought out the approaches involved when people were to be governed, while 
viewing these as having motivations distinct from the state. 
1.3. The open-ended secular historicity of the reason of state 
From the perspective of the raison d’état, the state is not a given entity but a process of 
permanent reconstitution and, as such, an artificial reality. As a highly human reality, the 
state was not merely an ideal to steer by; the principles of good government were 
correctives that had to be taken into account and adapted to.20 Accordingly, the raison 
d’état was, therefore, not the pure expression of despotic arbitrariness but a singular 
approach to the world committed to its own specific rationality. A specific and 
immediately accessible truth had replaced a transcendent and universal truth in the 
beyond, which previous modes of rule had hitherto aimed for and endeavored to realize. 
At the end of the Middle Ages, ‘state’ no longer referred to a ‘state of peace’ but rather 
– in Thomas Hobbes’ terms – to a sovereign “actor” that ensured the peace and stability 
of “the body politic” by installing a hierarchy. The principle of a raison d’état entails the 
notion of a state created and maintained through governmentality. It therefore became 
possible for subjects of the state to collaborate on constructing, preserving, and 
reconstituting a new state within the state, as organized around the new approaches to 
governmentality. This change was decisive for the conglomerate of different political 
institutions to become possible. In prolongation hereof, Louis XIV’s (1638–1715) 
government can be seen to introduce the specificity of the raison d’état into the general 
forms of sovereignty and in this manner be able to also articulate sovereign grandeur in 
terms of governmentality. This development is expressed most emphatically and 
emblematically in the famous dictum attributed to the Sun King: “L’État, c’est moi.”21 
The new political reality of the early modern state set new limitations on government, 
namely the necessity of a logic to be followed if governmental action were to be successful. 
Ultimately, this logic only respected the body politic to the extent that it was advantageous 
for the sovereign. In a coup d’état, where the existing order is suspended, we find a 
situation in which the raison d’état could be viewed in its purest format. In a coup, which 
follows its own artificial and political justice, the state appears in such a manner that it 
can dispose of the existing institutions and order to replace one state with another. The 
obligation towards the principles of good government, the raison d’état, makes it possible 
 
19 Botero, The Reason of State [1589] (1856), 3. 
20 According to Foucault, the state must be created through intervention and thus becomes a regulative 
principle for governmental reason (cf. Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 294–314; The Birth of Biopolitics, 163-185). 
21 Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 252/Security, Territory, Population, 324. 
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to distinguish violence from brutality. Sheer brutality is arbitrary and therefore also 
irrational and contemptible. However, there is no contradiction between violence and 
rationality. Violence is rational insofar as it is a necessity required by specific situations. 
In violence, the necessity of raison d’état thus appears in its purest form. 
For the first time, a truly historical mode of being appeared – historicity as such. Both 
the Christian pastoral approach and traditional modalities of rule had pointed toward the 
end of history. Since peace remained precarious and stability fragile, the demand could, 
in principle, never be completely met. Such a mode of existence was tragic in a different 
way than the Ancient tragedies as it was not concerned with the tragic predicament of the 
human condition within a larger cosmos as such. The tragedy appeared because human 
beings were now inscribed in their own history where they sought to remove the sources 
of insecurity and create an acceptable existence but were forced to do this by competing 
with each other through risky strategies and mutual attacks. Insecurity was therefore 
certain to reappear only to be tackled at an ever-higher level, such that any stability or 
continuity of existence became a pipe dream. The tragedy was that there could be no 
respite from such a secular history since it was endless.22 
2. THE BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS: A TURNING-POINT  
With raison d’état and the reconceptualization of peace as a state of stability that appeared 
in force of a dynamic balance between various forces, a new form of political thinking and 
practice that conceived of itself as fundamentally dynamic became possible. 
2.1. The open-ended European balance of power and its internal police 
Through the Peace of Westphalia, in the wake of the Thirty Years War (1618–1648), a new 
European order, built upon the evolutionary peace of diplomacy, was given paradigmatic 
expression. It implied a reorganization of the European system of states in early 
modernity. The idea of Europe as a hierarchy that could be gathered in one ultimate form, 
the empire, was relinquished. Instead, the continent was perceived as an aristocracy of 
states between which there was a sort of parity, meaning that a certain balance had to be 
struck to avoid disparities of power between the states. Over time, there arose a 
diplomatic-military complex in order to regulate the relative strength between states, such 
that a multilateral balance could be maintained. 
Raison d’état leads to the development of a new governmental technology directed at 
the internal organization of states that went by the name of ‘police.’23 This was not yet 
understood as a delimited state authority that was given the task to ensure the public’s 
safety and security.24 Instead, the name refers to the technologies for individual and 
 
22 The paradigm representative of the form of tragedy in Antiquity is Sophocles (ca. 495– 406 BC). The modern 
form of tragedy connected to the raison d’état includes Shakespeare’s (1564–1616) Macbeth and King Lear and 
Racine’s (1639–1699) Britannicus and Andromaque. 
23 Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 375/Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 365. 
24 “The notion of police, even in France today, is frequently misunderstood. When one speaks to a Frenchman 
about police, he can only think of people in uniform or in the secret service. In the 17th and 18th centuries, 
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collective governing in order to maintain internal peace and stability; in short, to uphold 
the social order. The European balance of states was therefore dependent on each country 
having an efficient police force in order to prevent revolutions and popular uprisings that 
could unhinge this carefully constructed system of diplomacy.  
The middle of the century saw the first initiatives toward an independent program for 
an organized police state. France had developed an extensive police force already in the 
previous century. Germany made this issue the object of academic and practical studies 
when the first professorships of police and cameral sciences were established in 1727. 
Notably, this program was developed by Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi (1717–1771) 
in instructive dissertations such as Grundsätze der Polizey-Wissenschaft (Principles of Police 
Science) from 1757 and Staatswirtschaft oder systematische Abhandlung aller ökonomischen und 
Cameralwissenschaften (State Economy or Systematic Treatise on All Economic and Cameralist 
Sciences), published in 1755. Here, von Justi sought to answer the basic question of raison 
d’état: How should one govern in the face of many contingent and unpredictable events? 
The answer was to collect as much knowledge about the object to be governed as possible, 
namely the state. If the police ensured the internal order and improved the state’s abilities, 
it had to ensure not only the survival of citizens but also the improvement of their 
competencies and abilities. Only with such measures could citizen satisfaction, order and 
progress be secured. With von Justi, police technology therefore initiated a permanent 
intervention into people’s lives, the purpose of which was not only to avoid the 
detrimental features of life but also actively to improve the quality of life. The task was 
therefore not mainly to repress but to ensure the secular development of welfare. 
2.2. The biopolitics of the population 
In the wake of the police sciences’ focus on the importance of citizen welfare and security, 
a new political object crystallizes as the primary target for political leadership, the 
population. Foucault claims that it was not until the appearance of the police and its 
technologies that there was a consideration of the population’s particular nature and 
character. Prior to this, the population had been viewed as a resource alongside other 
resources in developing the sovereign’s political strength.25 It appeared as a condition for 
exercising government, whose quality and nature was taken more or less for granted. 
With the appearance of mercantilism and Colbertism in the 1600s, this changed.26 The 
 
‘police’ signified a program of government rationality. This can be characterized as a project to create a 
system of regulation of the general conduct of individuals whereby everything would be controlled to the 
point of self-sustenance, without the need of intervention” (Foucault, “Espace, savoir, pouvoir” [1982] (1994), 
272/Foucault, “Space, Knowledge, and Power,” [1982] (2000), 351). 
25Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 56-81/Security, Territory, Population, 55-79. 
26 Mercantilism concerns a number of ideas about balancing trade, which influenced European policies in the 
17th and most of the 18th century. Thomas Mun’s (1571–1641) England’s Treasure by Forraign Trade (1664) was 
an important contribution to this tradition. Louis XIV’s finance minister Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1619–1683) 
implemented policies based on mercantilist ideas. Foucault views mercantilism and Colbertism as novel 
approaches to solving the problem of governmentality, rather than economical doctrines that anticipated the 
science of economics per se. 
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population became a resource to be developed by the government, and citizens the 
decisive factor upon which all other variables depended.27 A plentiful and productive 
population was the precondition for a country’s subsistence (and for low prices in 
agricultural products, since it was here labor was replenished). Indeed, this also applied 
to manufacture. A large and industrious population resulted in low prices for the final 
products and allowed for exports rather than imports. In return, this made it possible for 
the state to accumulate wealth, thus bolstering the state’s position in its competition with 
other states. 
The tendencies found there were intensified in the police sciences and related 
technologies since it conceptualized ‘population’ as the true and privileged object of 
police interference. It became, in so many words, the primary object of attention for 
political governmentality. The population became a decisive and unifying factor in a 
developmental dynamic that the government was dependent on and included in. 
In the police sciences, these tendencies reached their highest peak for that age when 
the population was conceptualized as the true and privileged object of police interference, 
whereby it also became the overall issue for political governance. The subjects of a 
country, understood and treated as a population, were the primary task for the state and 
government. This resulted in a specific issue of population: Since the king’s subjects 
appeared in unison as a population, it was no longer possible to view them solely as a 
group of legal subjects – instead they were perceived and treated as a mass of living beings. 
When population became the crux of the matter, however, there was an effort to 
develop a kind of leadership that could not be reduced to regimentation of the body 
politics through law and discipline. When a population of living beings was to be 
governed, they could not primarily be managed as merely belonging to some substantial 
universality, in this case humankind, which would be viewed as equipped with natural 
legal rights and a basic inalterable human nature, as would seem rational to presuppose 
within the relative order that natural history laid bare. Rather, one began to govern an 
assembly of individuals that belonged together in force of their being members of the 
same species, homo sapiens, wherefore they were saturated with the dynamic of life.28 A 
random group of people does not constitute a population. A population must be sizeable 
enough to have birth and mortality rates and a state of health that it must be able to 
develop or degenerate. 
Mortality caused by fever and suicide could be the same from year to year despite 
changes made for individual members of the population. However, it became possible to 
ascertain that infant mortality was higher than mortality for adults and that urban areas 
had a higher mortality rate than rural areas. In other words, the population could be 
viewed as a collection of living beings that exhibited seemingly random behavior but that 
was in fact imbued with regularity. This was possible because the population was 
 
27 Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 69-77/Security, Territory, Population, 67-75. 
28 Life appeared as a dynamic perspective within governance around the same time as the transition 
occurred from natural history to biology. 
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saturated with life processes, that is, the population began to exhibit a natural character.29 
The population was, therefore, not merely a collection of legal subjects or random people 
living in one area. A population exhibited fertility, mortality, health rates, and pathology. 
Statistical data about the population was initially collected in Germany during the 
1700s. This was used to determine the political and economic strength of a country. 
Furthermore, similar efforts were taken up in England and France to develop the idea 
of statistical laws and regularities. This resulted in the idea of normal or averages at 
the beginning of the 18th century. Despite individual differences, populations exhibited 
regularity. 
As a part of the effort to improve control, France, England, and Austria began to 
use data-collection aimed at improving the state of the population in specified areas 
but also to collect taxes, recruit soldiers, and assess the strength of the state. There was 
a growing interest for the health of the population. Initially, this interest in the health 
of the population and its regularity did not lead to any subsequent intervention.30 In 
the longer run, however, the grooving interest that political leadership and sciences 
took in the health of the population led to the discovery that its naturalness was not 
permanent and unalterable. The natural, biological processes that moved through a 
population depended on the environment. Changes in the environment altered the 
basis for how biological entities function. The natural regularities identified by the 
state and government therefore gave rise to careful intervention, which sought to 
control these changes in a desired way.31 There were many kinds of intervention, but 
they all had to take the logic of the living, human population into account. 
 
2.3. An open-ended bio-political governance of welfare and security 
The discovery that the population was an entity the government had to take care of and 
ensure the well-being of, resulted in – and was further perpetuated through – the creation 
of public health and hygiene. In this new gestation of the population, humankind began 
to figure as a biological species characterized by a certain lawfulness, which government 
could study and affect. In this way, government came to be perceived as a form of power, 
the exercise of which had the human being’s social biology as its chief object. In this 
manner, thus, a new kind of biopolitics took shape that Foucault had begun to articulate 
in the first volume of his History of Sexuality, The Will to Knowledge, insofar as it “brought 
life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge-power 
an agent of transformation of human life.”32 With the establishment of this kind of 
biopolitics, the life of the human species would enter into the field of politics and “the 
 
29 Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 69-77/Security, Territory, Population, 67-75. 
30 Michel Foucault, “La politique de la santé au XVIIIe siècle, 1978/1994: 166. 
31 Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 375-376/Security, Territory, Population, 366. 
32 Michel Foucault, Histoire de la sexualite 1: La volonté de savoir, 1977-78, 188/Michel Foucault, The Will to 
Knowledge, 143. 
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order of knowledge and power,” where it would become an important object of 
knowledge as well as for political techniques and political interventions.33  
As it became subject to a more systematic gathering of a wealth of knowledge and the 
target of interventions, human life would become visible, enter into history and acquire a 
historicity in a new existential sense. Insofar as historical processes and motions of human 
life would blend, interact and intra-act, human life would acquire a bio-history, and at the 
horizon of epistemology the experience would appear of what it “meant to be a living 
species in a living world, to have a body, conditions of existence, probabilities of life, and 
individual and collective welfare, forces that could be modified, and a space in which they 
could be distributed in an optimal manner.”34 
3. THE FRUGALITY OF GOVERNMENT IN CLASSICAL LIBERALISM 
In Naissance de la biopolitique, Foucault analyzes liberalism as an art of government that 
intensifies and refines the tradition of raison d’état rather than breaking with its 
fundamental assumptions.35 In the reflective practice of raison d’état, governing rationally 
means to enable “a given state to arrive at its maximum of being in a considered, reasoned 
and calculated way.36 This means that any self-limitation on the part of governmentality 
is drawn to attain the immanent goal of maximizing its own strength. Governmental 
rationality will, in other words, impose limits to the extent “that it can calculate them on 
its own account in terms of its objectives and [the] best means of achieving them.”37 In 
Foucault’s reading, the birth of liberalism is inseparable from the notion of “frugal 
government,” by which the question of “the too much and too little” develops into the 
central criterion around which the art of government will revolve.38 And, according to 
Foucault, “starting from the end of the eighteenth century, throughout the nineteenth 
century, and obviously more than ever today, the fundamental problem [of liberalism] is 
not the constitution of states, but without a doubt the question of the frugality of 
government.”39 
The overruling principle of raison d’état being the maximizing of the state’s strength, 
Foucault primarily sees mercantilism less as proto-economic doctrine than as a particular 
 
33 Foucault, La volonté de savoir, 186/Foucault, The Will to Knowledge, 139-40. In The Will to Knowledge, Foucault 
further characterized the threshold in this manner: “For the first time in history, no doubt, biological 
existence was reflected in political existence; the fact of living was no longer an inaccessible substrate that 
only emerged from time to time, amid the randomness of death and its fatality; part of it passed into 
knowledge’s field of control and power’s sphere of intervention. Power would no longer be dealing simply 
with legal subjects over whom the ultimate dominion was death, but with living beings, and the mastery it 
would be able to exercise over them would have to be applied at the level of life itself” (La volonté de savoir, 
187/Foucault 1978: 142-43). 
34 La volonté de savoir, 187/The Will to Knowledge, 142. 
35 Naissance de la biopolitique, 29; cf. 15–16/The Birth of Biopolitics, 28; cf. 14. 
36 Naissance de la biopolitique, 6/The Birth of Biopolitics, 4. 
37 Naissance de la biopolitique, 13/The Birth of Biopolitics, 11. 
38 Naissance de la biopolitique, 70/The Birth of Biopolitics, 28. 
39 Naissance de la biopolitique, 30-31/The Birth of Biopolitics, 29. 
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strategy for organizing commercial production and circulation, the aim of which was the 
accumulation of bullion, thus strengthening its position vis-à-vis other states.40 The 
permanent objective of improving the military-diplomatic power of the state 
notwithstanding, in Foucault’s analysis mercantilism is intimately linked to the 
administrative techniques and statistical forms of knowledge of policing. Concerned with 
maximizing the volume, productivity and health of the inhabitants, policing was 
principally exercised by means “of permanent, continually renewed, and increasingly 
detailed regulation.”  
An incessant and indefinite government of such a self-sufficient type, the liberal 
critique objected, would never be able to give any comprehensive account as to why it 
was governing in the first place, nor of how it was to govern in the best possible way. 
Such “over-regulatory policing” was unable to deal with the contingency that is the 
“spontaneous regulation of the course of things.”41 Thus, contrary to the principle of 
maximizing government, the liberal critique pointed to the principle that government 
should recognize and take account of the self-regulation of the governed, which also 
implied that not just any type of government would be an appropriate government. The 
regulation of government should take hold of this self-regulation of the governed by 
imposing on itself what Foucault describes as a work of “auto-limitation.”42 Classical 
liberalism championed an art of government that intervened in the affairs of its subjects 
according to a quantitative scale but prioritizing the minimum necessary degree of 
intervention as the optimum, as long as this was appropriate with regard to the self-
regulation of the population. 
Foucault suggests that the late 18th century liberal art of governing is describable as 
the emergence of a new principle of “frugal government” within the governmentality of 
raison d’état. It was the entry into the art of government of the problematics pertaining to 
the question of the prudent or sparing exercise of government that took care to confine 
governmental intervention to the extent necessary. A good government considers, reflects 
upon and fine-tunes its operations according to its overall goals and the nature of what it 
governs. As such, good government confirms the answer that a group of merchants, in 
Marquis d’Argenson’s (1694–1757) famous account, should have given to a mercantilist 
minister asking them what he could do for commerce: Laissez-nous faire.43 
The issue of the frugality of government is addressed in both French and British 
political thought around 1800, where a number of prominent writers rejected the idea that 
natural social developments must necessarily be managed or governed. These writers did 
not, therefore, seek to create a design for the best society but rather concentrated on 
existing governmentality in order to address and exert an influence on it. This was a 
 
40 Naissance de la biopolitique, 7/The Birth of Biopolitics, 5; Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 285-310/Security, 
Territory, Population, 293-318. 
41 Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 348, 362, 352/Security, Territory, Population, 340, 354, 344. 
42 Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 12/Security, Territory, Population, 10. 
43 D’Argenson, “Lettre à l’auteur du Journal économique au sujet de la Dissertation sur le commerce de M. le 
Marquis Belloni,” Journal économique (April 1751), 107–117; quoted in Naissance de la biopolitique, 28, n. 16–17/ 
The Birth of Biopolitics, 25 n. 16–17. 
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radical and provocative development for the time insofar as it was not only a critique 
pointing to the faults of the practice of government but also a statement that pointed out 
that governments ignored the important guidelines for government and simply governed 
too much or in an excessive manner. Such a line of reasoning, which can be found in 
thinkers such as François Quesnay (1694–1774), Adam Smith (1723–1799), and Jeremy 
Bentham (1748–1832), was radical but was also presented as containing a number of 
practical ideas for concrete reforms, before they became unified into a coherent theory. 
In his Tableau économique from 1758, which developed the core ideas of Physiocratic 
economic theory, Quesnay emphasized that the best kind of police did not interfere in 
everything. The best way for ensuring the good of the nation and society was to have a 
solid constitution, rather than interfering in trade. The aim was to leave society to its own 
devices and to the effects of mutual competition. As Quesnay succinctly stated in his 
famous maxim XXV of his Maximes générales du gouvernement économique d’un royaume 
agricole (General Maxims for the Economic Government of an Agricultural Kingdom): 
“Let there be complete liberty in commerce; for the surest, most exact, and most profitable 
policy for interior and exterior commerce of the state and nation consists in the greatest 
possible freedom in competition”.44 
3.1. The truth of the market and the use of government  
Foucault identifies two interrelated problematics of primary importance for the formation 
of governmentality. The first of these is the installation of the market as a place and 
instrument for the formation of truth.45 From the Middle Ages to the 18th century, the 
market had essentially been “a site of justice” that was tightly organized in order to 
prevent fraud and theft. Exchange was characterized by an extreme and thorough 
regulation pertaining to what products were to be sold, their origin and manufacture, and 
not least their price. Market prices had to reflect “the just price, that is to say, a price that 
was to have a certain relationship with work performed, with the needs of the merchants, 
and, of course, with the consumers’ needs and possibilities.” Overall, the market was “a 
site of jurisdiction” in the sense that it functioned as “a place where what had to appear 
in exchange and be formulated in the price was justice.”46 
A fundamental transformation of significant importance occurred in the 18th century 
that enabled the formulation of a liberal art of government. By way of 18th-century 
political economy, the market was reconfigured as a place with a certain naturalness that 
one had to be knowledgeable about. From being an ordre artificiel, established and 
regulated through mercantilist policies, the market had become an ordre naturel. From 
being a site of jurisdiction, the market had become a site for the formation of a “normal,” 
“good,” “natural,” or “true price,” that is, a price that “fluctuates around the value of the 
product” and is determined by the interplay between the costs of production and the 
 
44 François Quesnay, "Maximes générales du gouvernement économique d’un royaume agricole" [1978], in 
Œuvres Économiques complètes et autres textes. Vol. I. (2005), 571; my translation. 
45 Naissance de la biopolitique, 31/The Birth of Biopolitics, 29. 
46 Naissance de la biopolitique, 32-33/The Birth of Biopolitics, 30-31. 
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concrete demand rather than notions of justness.47 To the extent that prices were formed 
through “the natural mechanisms of the market they constitute a standard of truth which 
enables us to discern which governmental practices are correct and which are 
erroneous.”48 In this sense, the market had become a “regime of veridiction” as to the 
governmental practice –  not because political economy as such tells the truth to 
government but because political economy points to the site where a government needs 
to look “to find the principle of truth of its own governmental practice.”49 
Foucault associates the second problematic of importance for the formation of the new 
art of government with 19th-century English radicalism and utilitarianism. Here a new 
critique of the proper limitation of government is established based on an estimation of the 
utility versus the non-utility of governmental actions and interventions.50 With reference 
to the general utility of governmental practice, the critique is to confront cases in which 
regulation would be unreasonable, counterproductive, or simply futile, and for that 
reason it seeks to define the limits of governmental competence on the basis of what it will 
be useful or useless for government to do or not to do. It is from this position the radical 
limitation-critique can persistently raise the question to all governmental actions: Is this 
useful and for what? Within what limits is it useful? And when does it become harmful? 
These questions come very close to what Jeremy Bentham, at a relatively late point, 
sought to distinguish as the agenda and the non-agenda when he designated that the rule 
of conduct for economic actions and similar initiatives of government should form the 
criterion for whether or not governmental interference could be expected to increase 
general happiness according to the utilitarian principle of maximizing happiness and 
minimizing pain.51 Utilitarianism should be regarded as more than a philosophy or 
science since it is first and foremost a technological attempt to define the competences of 
the art of government with a more or less direct reference to what Foucault regards as “the 
fundamental question of liberalism”: “What is the utility value of government and all 
actions of government in a society where exchange determines the true value of things?”52 
These two central elements – the market as a site of veridiction operating through the 
principle of exchange, and the limitation calculus through which the utility of government 
is measured – Foucault understands as unified by the notion of interest. The new art of 
government is less organized around self-referring states that aim to maximize military 
might, manpower, and wealth than with the complexities of interests as they manifest 
themselves in the delicate “interplay between individual and collective interests, between 
social utility and economic profit, between the equilibrium of the market and the regime 
 
47 Naissance de la biopolitique, 33/The Birth of Biopolitics, 31. 
48 Naissance de la biopolitique, 34/The Birth of Biopolitics, 32. 
49 Naissance de la biopolitique, 34/The Birth of Biopolitics, 32. 
50 Naissance de la biopolitique, 53/The Birth of Biopolitics, 51; cf also Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 76/Security, 
Territory, Population, 74. 
51 Jeremy Bentham, Method and Leading Features of an Institute of Political Economy (including finance) considered 
not only as a Science but also as an Art [1800-1804]; quoted in Naissance de la biopolitique, 26-27, n9/ The Birth of 
Biopolitics, 24, n9. 
52 Naissance de la biopolitique, 48/The Birth of Biopolitics, 46. 
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of public authorities, between basic rights and the independence of the governed.”53 From 
directly intervening in and regulating things, men and wealth with the aim of maximizing 
the state’s strength, government should only deal with these insofar as they are of interest 
to somebody. Hence, as Foucault states, government “is only interested in interest.”54 Still, 
and notably, government “must not obstruct the interplay of individual interest,” not only 
because of respect for freedom of circulation and self-regulation of the population but also 
because it is impossible for government to have full knowledge of the logic of this 
multiplicity of interests it seeks to encourage.55 
The correlation between the multiplicity of mutual individual interests can only be 
established in the form of a mutual benefit and enrichment established and maintained 
over time in the long term. Even though the benefits of competition may not be divided 
equally between the buyer and the seller, the beneficial effects of economic exchange and 
competition will, according to the physiocrats, as well as to early liberals thinkers such as 
Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson, be profitable in the long run for the participants in 
general, provided that the process of exchange is permitted to follow its free course to 
constantly establish the natural, right and just price for the exchange.  For Foucault, this 
“new raison d’État” or this “reason of the least state” which “finds the core of its veridiction 
in the market and its de facto jurisdiction in utility” draws the outline of an open-ended 
conception of history: “We enter an age of an economic historicity governed by, if not 
unlimited enrichment, then at least reciprocal enrichment through the game of 
competition.”56 
When the idea of an unending progress in wealth central to liberalism begins to push 
over the theme of a European equilibrium established through diplomacy, by contrast, 
one begins to make out the outline of an unconfined and never-ending competition to the 
general benefit of all, even though it might be detrimental to some. A Europe now 
beginning to regard itself as being in a state of unending, permanent and collective 
enrichment through its own competition with itself can no longer be regarded as a closed 
and confined unity. Instead, Europe becomes an unending and open-ended competitive 
game in which the rest of the world is also at stake. Whereas the consequences of an 
economic game that was still conceived as “finite”57 were blocked in the calculation of a 
European diplomatic balance, the outline of a “new type of global calculation in European 
governmental practice” begins to appear.58 In this new planetary rationality, the scale of 
the world and the entire globe is at stake in an open-ended historicity. 
 
53 Naissance de la biopolitique, 46/The Birth of Biopolitics, 44. 
54 Naissance de la biopolitique, 47/The Birth of Biopolitics, 45. 
55 Naissance de la biopolitique, 282/The Birth of Biopolitics, 280. 
56 Naissance de la biopolitique, 55-56/The Birth of Biopolitics, 54. 
57 Naissance de la biopolitique, 57/The Birth of Biopolitics, 55; English translation corrected. 
58 Naissance de la biopolitique, 57/The Birth of Biopolitics, 56. 
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3.2. The birth of natural politics in the liberal art of government 
Foucault makes it a crucial point that it is misleading to confine liberalism to a pure and 
simple economic or political doctrine. Instead, liberalism is to be perceived as a far more 
general phenomenon, a new decisive turn within the art of government, insofar as it is 
characterized by the three salient features articulated by him: an art of government 
pledging its faith to the veridiction of the market, limiting itself by the calculation of 
governmental utility and positioning Europe as a region within an unlimited and never-
ending exchange and competition. Moreover, rather than liberalism understood as a 
politico-economic doctrine simply asserting the freedom of the individual per se or 
recognizing the essential, basic natural rights of individuals, this liberal art of government 
distinguishes itself by another fundamental feature: Instead of being perceived as an 
orthodox doctrine proclaiming specific rights or the juridical freedom of the individual, 
the liberal art of government should be viewed as characterized by naturalism. 
Towards the end of Security, Territory, Population, it is made clear that what appears 
with liberalism is a new notion of “naturalness intrinsic to population.”59 As a result of 
the relationships between the members of the population, and the dynamics that arises 
from the interaction between their particular interests, the population appears as a 
composition that is endowed with a “naturalness,” an impenetrable density and a 
“thickness, with internal mechanisms of regulation;”60 and the “absolute value of the 
population as a natural and living reality”61 will be the reality that the state will have to 
take into account and be responsible for.  
The naturalness that appears is a “social naturalness” or a “naturalness of society, “a 
naturalness specific to man’s life in common,”62 or a transactional reality that arises as 
living human beings with different inclinations, preferences and interests live together 
and begin to interact. For this reason, the naturalness described is equally a transformable 
historical reality. The naturalness of human population is historical simply because it is 
social and because it, as a result of continuous antagonistic social interaction, is a dynamic 
historic reality under continuous development. As it is said towards the end of The Birth 
of Biopolitics, “the nature of human nature is to be historical, because the nature of human 
nature is to be social. There is no human nature which is separable from the very fact of 
society.”63 More importantly, the naturalness of the human population is historical in the 
radical sense that its social antagonism is the very “motor of history.” According to 
Foucault, we have a specifically “economic mechanism which shows how, starting from 
civil society and from the economic game which it harbors within itself, so to speak, we 
move on to a whole series of historical transformation. The principle of dissociative 
association is also a principle of historical transformation. That which produces the unity 
 
59 Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 359/Security, Territory, Population, 352. 
60 Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 359/Security, Territory, Population, 352. 
61 Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 363/Security, Territory, Population, 355. 
62 Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 357, 358/Security, Territory, Population, 448, 449. 
63 Naissance de la biopolitique, 303/The Birth of Biopolitics, 299. 
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of the social fabric is at the same time that which produces the principle of historical 
transformation.”64 
 As a consequence, the naturalness specific to man’s life in common is not a pre-given 
or primitive nature; a primordial constitution. Rather, it is an artificial naturalness since it 
is the result of human interaction; and it is thus also a historical naturalness under 
constant development. 
4. FORMS OF HISTORICITY 
With the conception of a naturalness intrinsic to the population that government has to 
study and respect, put forward by liberal governmentality, the rationality of government 
takes a new decisive turn. Nevertheless, as Foucault repeatedly makes clear, this turn 
should not be perceived and conceived as an all-decisive break or rupture but rather as a 
decisive modification. Despite its twists and turns, the history of governmentality is also 
characterized by a relative continuity. In many respects, the breach and the rupture 
between the history of governmentality and the prehistory of governmentality is 
considered more significant by Foucault than the distance or the differences between the 
later phases in the history governmentality.65 
4.1 The appearance of an open-ended natural history 
For a very long time in Western societies, the guidelines for regulating the potentially 
indefinite exercise of power was, according to Foucault, sought in the development of the 
wisdom of those in power. Wisdom implied the knowledge and the ability to govern in 
accordance with the basic order of things. It was the insight and the temperance that 
allowed the ruler to govern in accordance with what “the general human and divine order 
may prescribe.”66 Basically, this meant modelling and regulating government in terms of 
the truth,67 as it was revealed in religious texts or in the order of the world, even though 
ascertaining the unvarnished truth might require education and interpretation since the 
truth often appeared somewhat enigmatically. 
 
64 Naissance de la biopolitique, 310/The Birth of Biopolitics, 306. 
65 In Security, Territory, Population, Foucault underlines how “the state rationality, this raison d’État, which 
continues in fact, to dominate the économistes’ thought, will” only “be modified,” and that he seeks to 
highlight some of these “essential modifications.” By contrast, the raison d’État “carves out a new division, 
or even introduces a radical break” with the “natural order” of an earlier “cosmological-theological 
framework” (Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 356-357/Security, Territory, Population, 348-49). At the beginning 
of The Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault highlights that the “regime of liberalism,” as opposed to raison d’État, is 
“fundamentally modifying (it) without, perhaps, questioning its basis” (Naissance de la biopolitique, 198/The 
Birth of Biopolitics, 22). And he goes on to point out that we “will only be able to grasp what biopolitics is” 
“when we know what this governmental regime called liberalism was” and are able to clarify how it 
constitutes a new turn modifying the bio-politics of the reason of state. Towards the end of the lectures of 
1979, Foucault speaks of a “re-centering/de-centering of the governmental reason” (Naissance de la biopolitique, 
314/The Birth of Biopolitics, 311). 
66 Naissance de la biopolitique, 310/The Birth of Biopolitics, 311. 
67 Naissance de la biopolitique, 310/The Birth of Biopolitics, 311. 
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During the pre-history of governmentality as it came to the fore in pastoral power, the 
exercise of power and rule when understood as a protective shepherding continued to be 
perceived within a cosmo-theological continuum; and until the end of the Middle Ages 
and the beginning of Modernity, the exercise of power thus continued to be regulated by 
the obligation to serve and render a more basic fundamental truth.68 Here, human beings 
and the ruler had to take stock of and measure up to a world governed by final causes. 
The world governed in a pastoral fashion was a world governed to a system of salvation 
that culminated in man, but where men had to live in this world above all with the aim of 
passing on to another world.69 
With the appearance of the new kinds of knowledge from around 1580-1660 described 
at the beginning of this article, this cosmological-theological framework not only began to 
dissolve but was also disputed as the primary justification for the exercise of power and 
the ruler’s dominion over men.70 As the appearance of new kinds of natural science 
unveiling the general principles of nature made it manifest that God did not intervene 
directly in the world to govern the world in individual instances but only ruled over the 
world through general laws, it became impossible for the sovereigns and leaders of this 
world to mold their exercise of power on Godly rule and to legitimize their art of 
governance as a governing in accordance with and reflected by the divine order of things. 
As a consequence, the art of government, or the activity in which human beings 
exercised power over other human beings, was forced to not only work out its own 
explicit secular formula and develop its specific technologies; concomitantly, the conduct 
of human conduct needed to develop a new specific rationality and justification.71 From 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the exercise of power was no longer adjusted in 
accordance with wisdom and molded on the representation of basic truths reflecting a 
general order. Instead of general wisdom, the art of government begins to become adjusted 
to a specific rationality and its calculation.72 The art of government becomes attuned to and 
regulated by the studied care in analyzing, calculating and affecting specific fields of 
forces and relations that play out within the specific field that the art of government seeks 
to govern. Instead of general truth, the indefinite art of government thus begins to become 
attuned to, regulated by and measured by, but also limited by73 an indispensable 
knowledge of its privileged object: the state, the people and the population. It was the 
attunement to and the limitation with reference to a knowledge of a specific and relative, 
artificial reality under development over which the art of government not only had to 
assert its power but remained dependent upon.74 
 
68 Cf. also Sverre Raffnsøe & Dorthe Staunæs, “Learning to Stay Ahead of Time: Moving Leadership 
Experiences Experimentally,” Management & Organizational History 9:2 (2014). 
69 Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 240/Security, Territory, Population, 234. 
70 Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 240-245/Security, Territory, Population, 234-238. 
71 Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 242/Security, Territory, Population, 237. 
72 Naissance de la biopolitique, 315/The Birth of Biopolitics, 311-12. 
73 Naissance de la biopolitique, 315/The Birth of Biopolitics, 311-12. 
74 Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 358-359/Security, Territory, Population, 351. 
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When the art of secular governance in the modern sense, or governmentality in the 
proper sense, was constituted in and through this major transformation, the first kind of 
governmentality to appear – constructing and articulating itself as a specific rationality by 
adjusting and attuning itself to an indispensable knowledge of the specific artificial reality 
over which it had to assert its power – was the raison d’État. 
This first rationalization of the art of government in the form of “the rationality of the 
sovereign state”75 committed governmentality to follow guidelines that were not simply 
internal to government itself. Rather, the rationalization of government admonished 
government to adjust itself to the guiding principles that its privileged object of 
intervention, the state and the augmentation of its artificial reality under the auspices of 
sovereignty, provided. Nevertheless, this initial stage of governmentality raised the 
question of a proper acquaintance with the forces and the specific logic of this relative 
artificial reality under development. 
As it was instigated by the French economists and carried more fully into effect by the 
English political economists, the second rationalization of the art of government argued 
that it was only possible to exercise the art of government if it was modelled on and 
regulated by not so much the rationality of the individual, the agency or the authority 
who is able to say “I am the state,” but rather on the rationality of those who were 
governed; and the liberal economist went on to develop further and articulate the 
collective rationality that the art of government was to be indexed upon: a collective 
rationality that came into being as the individual subjects to be governed followed their 
own specific rationality as agents employing the means they possessed in order to satisfy 
their own interests.76 With liberalism, the principle of rationalization of the art of 
government was found in the knowledge of the rational behavior of those who were 
governed.77 In this manner, the second decisive stage in the rationalization of the art of 
government made it clear that ultimately it proved impossible for the art of government 
to retain the bird’s eye view of the sovereign and the ruler as well as the first person 
perspective of the one who governs and its unitary form. For its own good, the art of 
government needed to incorporate and respect the view of those governed: the collective 
rationality and naturalness resulting from a number of agents each adopting their own 
first person point of view. The art of government and the reason of state ought to begin to 
submit to the first person plural of those that it aimed to govern.  
Already with the first stage in the rationalization of government, the reason of state 
opened a new kind of historicity. The obliging perspective of government having to 
govern and cope with an open-ended and merciless secular history challenged the idea of 
finding one’s bearings and leading the flock ahead within the existing framework of a 
cosmo-theological world order. In the second stage of the rationalization of government, 
liberalism made it plain that a guiding principle for the series of forms of this never-
ending history would be the logic that appears when the participants in this history each 
 
75 Naissance de la biopolitique, 316/The Birth of Biopolitics, 313. 
76 Naissance de la biopolitique, 316/The Birth of Biopolitics, 312. 
77 Naissance de la biopolitique, 316/The Birth of Biopolitics, 312. 
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follow their individual interests blind to the over-all pattern and perspective of this 
history still coming into being. This idea of a global historicity arising in and through a 
motor that would be “the perfectly logical, decipherable, and identifiable form or series 
of forms arising from blind initiatives, egoistic interests, and calculations which 
individuals only ever see in terms of themselves,” would become the “history of humanity 
in its globalizing effects,” a globalizing history of humanity that would spread on a global 
scale.78 At the end of the day, the idea of an ongoing, never-ending globalizing natural-
history generated by an interaction rending and re-weaving the social tissue (and 
demanding new forms of government) replaces the idea of a fall from the original 
transparence of a state of nature, and the corresponding demand for the restoration of 
original nature, in the establishment of a just empire and at the end of time. 
4.2. Freedom, dangerosity and security 
Even though there was neither beginning nor end to this natural history constantly being 
generated and re-generated, it was nevertheless characterized by certain recurrent traits 
and dispositions. It was a natural history developing as a result of the complex interaction 
among its participants as they conducted themselves freely; and it was a natural history 
that would come into existence as a result of the interaction between people who were 
able to conduct themselves freely. As a consequence, the art of government, as it was 
carried into effect in a governmentality rationalized on the joint rationality of those 
governed, would not only – and not so much need to – become “the management of 
freedom” by contenting itself with presupposing the freedom of individuals and with 
calling upon and respecting individual rights in order to find its own bearings within the 
interplay resulting. More radically, governmental rationality, as it was rationalized in 
liberal thought, would need to become the management of freedom in the sense that it 
would have to continuously re-organize and manage “the conditions on which one can 
be free.”79 Rather than just being able to rest upon the presupposition of the existence of 
freedom and of the right and the obligation to be free, the art of government would have 
to seek to produce, manage and take advantage of the exercise of freedom over and over 
again. As Foucault puts it: 
Broadlyspeaking, in the liberal art of government, freedom of behavior is entailed, 
called for, needed and serves as a regulator, but it also has to be produced and 
organized. So freedom in the regime of liberalism is not a given, it is not a ready-
made region which has to be respected, or if it is, it is so only partially, regionally in 
this or that case, etcetera. Freedom is something which is constantly produced. 
Liberalism is not acceptance of freedom; it proposes to manufacture it constantly, to 
arouse it and produce it, with, of course [the system of] constraints and the problems 
of cost raised by this production.80 
 
78 Naissance de la biopolitique, 310/The Birth of Biopolitics, 306; English translation corrected. 
79 Naissance de la biopolitique, 65/The Birth of Biopolitics, 64. 
80 Naissance de la biopolitique, 66/The Birth of Biopolitics, 65. 
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When having to produce, organize and manage freedom, however, the art of management 
will, according to Foucault, continuously and equally also have to consider, calculate and 
manage the cost of manufacturing freedom. The cost of freedom is dangerosity, and the 
principle of calculation of this cost is what Foucault calls security.81 The liberal art of 
government is constantly forced to determine: 
The precise extent to which and up to what point individual interest, that is to say, 
individual interests insofar as they are different and possibly opposed to each other, 
constitute a danger for the interest of all. The problem of security is the protection of the 
collective interest against individual interests. Conversely, individual interests have to 
be protected against everything that could be seen as an encroachment of the collective 
interest.82 
In response to this challenge, the liberal art of government must develop strategies of 
security that ensure that the economic game is possible. Insofar as the development of the 
natural history that forms the necessary prerequisite for the liberal art of government rests 
on a widespread individualized ability in the population to take risks and live 
dangerously, the liberal art of government faces the task of facilitating and enhancing this 
ability. To solve this problem, “an entire education and culture of danger appears in the 
nineteenth century which is very different from those great apocalyptic threats of plague, 
death, and war which fed the political and cosmological imagination of the Middle Ages 
and even of the seventeenth century. The horsemen of the Apocalypse disappear; and in 
their place everyday danger appear, emerge, and spread everywhere, perpetually being 
brought to life, reactualized, and circulated by what would be called the political culture 
of danger in the nineteenth century.”83 According to Foucault, early instances of this 
“stimulation of the fear of danger” and correlative attempts to soothe it can be found in 
campaigns for saving banks as a remedy to soothe the poverty of the lower classes at the 
start of the nineteenth century, as well as in the campaigns around disease and hygiene, 
but also in the campaigns against crime and concerning sexuality. He also stresses that 
“there is no liberalism without a culture of danger.”84 
Thus, an art of government concluding in a rationality of government based on the 
joint rationality of those who were governed had to face and come to terms with a natural 
history that was an antagonistic evolutional history marked not only by freedom but also 
by security.  
With liberalism, rationality of government not only becomes embedded in and 
committed to the necessity of a never-ending secular and merciless tragic history as it 
came to the fore with the reason of state; indeed, with liberal thought, the history of 
governmentality concludes in an unending historicity that is even one of an ongoing and 
still accentuated crisis. This experience of an ongoing crisis is closely related to the 
experience that the historicity that is generated as the participants each follow their own 
 
81 Naissance de la biopolitique, 66/The Birth of Biopolitics, 65. 
82 Naissance de la biopolitique, 66/The Birth of Biopolitics, 65. 
83 Naissance de la biopolitique, 68/The Birth of Biopolitics, 66. 
84 Naissance de la biopolitique, 68/The Birth of Biopolitics, 67. 
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rationality, blind to the overall pattern, constantly upsets and undermines what seems to 
be the very conditions of possibility for this exchange, wherefore it constantly generates 
its own dangerosity that necessitates amendment and strategies of security. In this, the 
governmentality of liberalism takes the modern form of relentless tragic history, 
appearing in connection with the reason of state, to the next level.  With liberalism, thus, 
a crisis takes a specific accentuated form that is not limited to the liberal art of government 
but has marked the modern form of government since it began to become perceptible with 
the reason of state, its police and management of the welfare of the population. 
Consequently, this crisis should in retrospect be understood as “a crisis of the general 
apparatus of government.”85 
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